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Will AI Achieve Consciousness? Wrong Question
We should not be creating conscious, humanoid agents but an entirely new sort of entity, rather like oracles, with no conscience, no fear of death, no
distracting loves and hates.
From "What Can We Do?" by Daniel C. Dennett.
Adapted from Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways
of Looking at AI, edited by John Brockman,
published by Penguin Press, an imprint of Penguin
Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random
House LLC. Copyright © 2019 by John
Brockman. PENGUIN PRESS
WHEN NORBERT WIENER,  the father of cybernetics, wrote his book The Human Use of
Human Beings in 1950, vacuum tubes were still the primary electronic building blocks, and
there were only a few actual computers in operation.
But he imagined the future we now contend with in impressive detail and with few clear
mistakes. More than any other early philosopher of artificial intelligence, he recognized
that AI would not just imitate—and replace—human beings in many intelligent activities
but would change human beings in the process. “We are but whirlpools in a river of ever-
flowing water,” he wrote. “We are not stuff that abides, but patterns that perpetuate
themselves.”
When attractive opportunities abound, for instance, we are apt to be willing to pay a little
and accept some small, even trivial cost of doing business for access to new powers. And
pretty soon we become so dependent on our new tools that we lose the ability to thrive
without them. Options become obligatory.
It’s an old, old story, with many well-known chapters
in evolutionary history. Most mammals can
synthesize their own vitamin C, but primates, having
opted for a diet composed largely of fruit, lost the
innate ability. The self-perpetuating patterns that we
call human beings are now dependent on clothes,
cooked food, vitamins, vaccinations, credit cards,
smartphones, and the internet. And—tomorrow if not
already today—AI.
Wiener foresaw several problems with this incipient
state of affairs that Alan Turing and other early AI
optimists largely overlooked. The real danger, he
said, is
that such machines, though helpless by themselves,
may be used by a human being or a block of human
beings to increase their control over the rest of the
race or that political leaders may attempt to control
their populations by means not of machines themselves but through political techniques as
narrow and indifferent to human possibility as if they had, in fact, been conceived
mechanically.
Sure enough, these dangers are now pervasive.
In media, for instance, the innovations of digital audio and video let us pay a small price (in
the eyes of audiophiles and film lovers) when we abandon analog formats, and in return
provide easy—all too easy?—reproduction of recordings with almost perfect fidelity.
But there is a huge hidden cost. Orwell’s Ministry of Truth is now a practical possibility. AI
techniques for creating all-but-undetectable forgeries of “recordings” of encounters are
now becoming available, which will render obsolete the tools of investigation we have
come to take for granted in the past 150 years.
Will we simply abandon the brief Age of Photographic Evidence and return to the earlier
world in which human memory and trust provided the gold standard, or will we develop
new techniques of defense and offense in the arms race of truth? (We can imagine a return
to analog film-exposed-to-light, kept in “tamper-proof” systems until shown to juries, etc.,
but how long would it be before somebody figured out a way to infect such systems with
doubt?
One of the disturbing lessons of recent experience is that the task of destroying a
reputation for credibility is much less expensive than the task of protecting such a
reputation. Wiener saw the phenomenon at its most general: “In the long run, there is no
distinction between arming ourselves and arming our enemies.” The information age is also
the disinformation age.
What can we do? A key phrase, it seems to me, is Wiener’s almost offhand observation,
above, that “these machines” are “helpless by themselves.” As I have been arguing recently,
we’re making tools, not colleagues, and the great danger is not appreciating the difference,
which we should strive to accentuate, marking and defending it with political and legal
innovations.
AI in its current manifestations is parasitic on human intelligence. It quite indiscriminately
gorges on whatever has been produced by human creators and extracts the patterns to be
found there—including some of our most pernicious habits. These machines do not (yet)
have the goals or strategies or capacities for self-criticism and innovation to permit them to
transcend their databases by reflectively thinking about their own thinking and their own
goals.
They are, as Wiener says, helpless, not in the sense of being shackled agents or disabled
agents but in the sense of not being agents at all—not having the capacity to be “moved by
reasons” (as Kant put it) presented to them. It is important that we keep it that way, which
will take some doing.
In the long term, “strong AI,” or general artificial intelligence, is possible in principle but not
desirable (more on this later). The far more constrained AI that’s practically possible today
is not necessarily evil. But it poses its own set of dangers—chiefly that it might be mistaken
for strong AI!
THE GAP BET WEEN  today’s systems and the science-fictional systems dominating the
popular imagination is still huge, though many folks, both lay and expert, manage to
underestimate it. Let’s consider IBM’s Watson, which can stand as a worthy landmark for
our imaginations for the time being.
It is the result of a very large-scale R&D process extending over many person-centuries of
intelligent design, and it uses thousands of times more energy than a human brain. Its
victory in Jeopardy! was a genuine triumph, made possible by the formulaic restrictions of
the Jeopardy! rules, but in order for it to compete, even these rules had to be revised (one of
those trade-offs: you give up a little versatility, a little humanity, and get a crowd-pleasing
show).
Watson is not good company, in spite of misleading ads from IBM that suggest a general
conversational ability, and turning Watson into a plausibly multidimensional agent would
be like turning a hand calculator into Watson. Watson could be a useful core faculty for
such an agent, but more like a cerebellum or an amygdala than a mind—at best, a special-
purpose subsystem that could play a big supporting role, but not remotely up to the task of
framing purposes and plans and building insightfully on its conversational experiences.
Why would we want to create a thinking, creative agent out of Watson? Perhaps Turing’s
brilliant idea of an operational test—the famous Turing test—has lured us into a trap: the
quest to create at least the illusion of a real person behind the screen, bridging the
“uncanny valley.”
The danger here is that ever since Turing posed his challenge—which was, after all, a
challenge to fool the judges—AI creators have attempted to paper over the valley with
cutesy humanoid touches, Disneyfication effects that will enchant and disarm the
uninitiated. Joseph Weizenbaum’s ELIZA, a very early chatbot, was the pioneer example of
such superficial illusion making, and it was his dismay at the ease with which his laughably
simple and shallow program could persuade people they were having a serious heart-to-
heart conversation that first sent him on his mission.
He was right to be worried. If there is one thing we have learned from the restricted Turing
test competitions for the annual Loebner Prize, it is that even very intelligent people who
aren’t tuned in to the possibilities and shortcuts of computer programming are readily
taken in by simple tricks.
The attitudes of people in AI toward these methods of dissembling at the “user interface”
have ranged from contempt to celebration, with a general appreciation that the tricks are
not deep but can be potent. One shift in attitude that would be very welcome is a candid
acknowledgment that humanoid embellishments are false advertising—something to
condemn, not applaud.
How could that be accomplished? Once we recognize that people are starting to make life-
or-death decisions largely on the basis of “advice” from AI systems whose inner operations
are unfathomable in practice, we can see a good reason why those who in any way
encourage people to put more trust in these systems than they warrant should be held
morally and legally accountable.
AI systems are very powerful tools—so powerful that even experts will have good reason
not to trust their own judgment over the “judgments” delivered by their tools. But then, if
these tool users are going to benefit, financially or otherwise, from driving these tools
through terra incognita, they need to make sure they know how to do this responsibly, with
maximum control and justification.
Licensing and bonding the operators of these systems, just as we license pharmacists,
crane operators, and other specialists whose errors and misjudgments can have dire
consequences, could, with pressure from insurance companies and other underwriters,
oblige creators of AI systems to go to extraordinary lengths to search for and reveal
weaknesses and gaps in their products, and to train those entitled to operate them to watch
out for them.
One can imagine a sort of inverted Turing test in which the judge is on trial; until he or she
can spot the weaknesses, the overstepped boundaries, the gaps in a system, no license to
operate will be issued. The mental training required to achieve certification as a judge will
be demanding. The urge to attribute humanlike powers of thought to an object, our normal
tactic whenever we encounter what seems to be an intelligent agent, is almost
overpoweringly strong.
Indeed, the capacity to resist the allure of treating an apparent person as a person is an
ugly talent, reeking of racism or species-ism. Many people would find the cultivation of
such a ruthlessly skeptical approach morally repugnant, and we can anticipate that even
the most proficient system users would occasionally succumb to the temptation to
“befriend” their tools, if only to assuage their discomfort with the execution of their duties.
No matter how scrupulously the AI designers launder the phony “human” touches out of
their wares, we can expect a flourishing of shortcuts, workarounds and tolerated distortions
of the actual “comprehension” of both the systems and their operators. The comically long
lists of known side effects of new drugs advertised on television will be dwarfed by the
obligatory revelations of the sorts of questions that cannot be responsibly answered by
particular systems, with heavy penalties for manufacturers who “overlook” flaws in their
products. (It is widely noted that a considerable part of the growing economic inequality in
today’s world is due to the wealth accumulated by digital entrepreneurs; we should enact
legislation that puts their deep pockets in escrow for the public good.)
WE DON’ T NEED  artificial conscious agents. There is a surfeit of natural conscious agents,
enough to handle whatever tasks should be reserved for such special and privileged
entities. We need intelligent tools. Tools do not have rights and should not have feelings
that could be hurt or be able to respond with resentment to “abuses” rained on them by
inept users.
One of the reasons for not making artificial conscious agents is that, however autonomous
they might become (and in principle they can be as autonomous, as self-enhancing or self-
creating, as any person), they would not—without special provision, which might be waived
—share with us natural conscious agents our vulnerability or our mortality.
I once posed a challenge to students in a seminar at Tufts on artificial agents and
autonomy: Give me the specs for a robot that could sign a binding contract with you—not
as a surrogate for some human owner but on its own. This isn’t a question of getting it to
understand the clauses or manipulate a pen on a piece of paper but of having and
deserving legal status as a morally responsible agent. Small children can’t sign such
contracts, nor can those disabled people whose legal status requires them to be under the
care and responsibility of guardians of one sort or another.
The problem for robots who might want to attain such an exalted status is that, like
Superman, they are too invulnerable to be able to make a credible promise. If they were to
renege, what would happen? What would be the penalty for promise breaking? Being
locked in a cell or, more plausibly, dismantled? Being locked up is barely an inconvenience
for an AI unless we first install artificial wanderlust that cannot be ignored or disabled by
the AI on its own (and it would be systematically difficult to make this a foolproof solution,
given the presumed cunning and self-knowledge of the AI); and dismantling an AI (either a
robot or a bedridden agent like Watson) is not killing it if the information stored in its
design and software is preserved.
The very ease of digital recording and transmitting— the breakthrough that permits
software and data to be, in effect, immortal—removes robots from the world of the
vulnerable (at least robots of the usually imagined sorts, with digital software and
memories). If this isn’t obvious, think about how human morality would be affected if we
could make “backups” of people every week, say. Diving headfirst on Saturday off a high
bridge without benefit of a bungee cord would be a rush that you wouldn’t remember when
your Friday night backup was put online Sunday morning, but you could enjoy the
videotape of your apparent demise thereafter.
So what we are creating are not—should not be—conscious, humanoid agents but an
entirely new sort of entity, rather like oracles, with no conscience, no fear of death, no
distracting loves and hates, no personality (but all sorts of foibles and quirks that would no
doubt be identified as the “personality” of the system): boxes of truths (if we’re lucky)
almost certainly contaminated with a scattering of falsehoods.
It will be hard enough learning to live with them without distracting ourselves with
fantasies about the Singularity in which these AIs will enslave us, literally. The human use
of human beings will soon be changed—once again—forever, but we can take the tiller and
steer between some of the hazards if we take responsibility for our trajectory.
Daniel C. Dennett is the Austin B. Fletcher professor of philosophy and codirector of the
Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University.
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